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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
his arbitration right in his answer or otherwise.3 2
In Terminal Auxiliar Mari v. Winkler Cr. Corp.83 defendant terminated its
contract with plaintiff due to the latter's supposed breach of the contract.
The contract broadly provided for arbitration of any dispute arising under it.
Plaintiff, believing that defendant breached the contract, brought a court
action and defendant, a foreign corporation, agreed to fully submit to the
court's jurisdiction, such submission to be "without prejudice to the ...remedies
. . . available to the parties," and to "pertain . . . only to the matter of the
jurisdiction of this court and to the posting of security." Shortly thereafter,
defendant sought an order directing arbitration and staying plaintiff's action.
Plaintiff opposed the motion, contending that: (1) no arbitrable issue existed
since defendant had terminated the charter contract, and (2) defendant
waived his right to arbitration by submitting to the court's jurisdiction.
In upholding the granting of the motion by the trial court, the Court
concluded that since the dispute arose under and subsequent to the charter
agreement, the contract's broad arbitration clause brought it within the authority
of Section 1450. They reasoned that to hold otherwise would be to nullify the
broad purpose of the statute, since most issues between parties stem from
supposed breaches by one party or the other. Therefore, the termination of
the contract did not extinguish the parties' right to arbitrate claims accruing
prior thereto. The Court further held that although the defendant had submitted to the court's jurisdiction, the agreed upon stipulation with the plaintiff
clearly evinced defendant's preservation of its right to compel arbitration.
CONSTRUCTION OF WORDS oF THE PARTIES

In Hempstead Theatre Corp. v. Metropolitan Playhouses Inc., plaintiff
corporation leased its theatres to Metropolitan, Inc., which in turn sublet to
defendant.3 The rent to be paid was a fixed minimum plus a graduated
percentage of gross receipts. The lease stated that these receipts should include,
among others, "all box office receipts, excluding taxes on admissions and all income derived from . . . concessions." The only question involved is whether
the "income" received from the candy concession is to be gross receipts, or
gross receipts less the cost of candy and refreshments sold? Plaintiff brought this
action for rental due, claiming the former interpretation. The Supreme Court
entered judgment for plaintiff, as did the Appellate Division, but the Court
of Appeals reversed in favor of defendants.
Each clause of a contract must be given its intended purpose in the
promotion of the primary and dominant purpose of the contract. 35 As to what
the rent should be, the lease stated when referring to the box office that
32. Zimmerman v. Cohen, 236 N.Y. 15, 139 N.E. 764 (1923).
33. 6 N.Y.2d 294, 189 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1959).
34. Hempstead Theatre Corporation v. Metropolitan Playhouses Inc., 6 N.Y.2d
311, 189 N.Y.S.2d 837 (1959).
- 35. Empire Properties Corporation v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 288 N.Y. 242, 43
N.E.2d 25 (1942).
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receipts should be the base, but when referring to the concession, the Word
"income" was used. Placing themselves in the position of the parties, 86 the
Court reasoned that the parties must have intended a different conclusion by
changing the base to "income" for the concession, viz: income used to denote
that costs were first to be deducted from gross receipts.
It should be noted, however, that the lease, when referring to the sale of
admissions or coupons outside the box office, stated that "net 'receipts" was
to be the applicable base there. Thus, at various places in the lease, the words
"gross receipts," "income" and "net receipts" were used. The Court, in
effect, equated "net receipts" and "income." They did so, however, on the
basis that since "income" was used instead of "gross receipts," their nmeanings
must have been intended to be different. Queare whether the same argument
could not be used in favor of a conclusion that "income'! should 'be equated
to "gross receipts," i.e., since the word "income" was used instead of "net receipts," was it not just as likely that the parties intended a different meaning
when comparing those two
The case at hand shows how two completely adverse interpretations may
be given a word that supposedly has but one traditional meaning in the
business world. It should be concluded, then, that no definitive label will
be placed upon certain words, but that their meanings will be determined solely
in the context in which they were written.
REr-ORMATION OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANT

In Ross v. "FoodSpecialties Inc. 37 plaintiff-appellant contracted with defendant- Corporation for the purchase of certain of the latter's trade names,
trademarks, copyrights, designs and formulas, for some of its products. Among
the items sold was a line of Chinese condiments, as to -which a restrictive covenant was signed by defendant's President. The covenant provided that defendant's President would not "engage directly or indirectly in any capacity
whatsoever in the business of manufacturing or selling Chinese condiments under
any trade name heretofore employed by [defendant's President], anywhere in
the United States for a period of two (2) years." Defendant's President was
actively connected with another corporation,* which corporation, immediately
after the contract in question was signed, began competing, with plaintiff by
probessing Chinese condiments under various other brand names. Plainiiff brings
this action to reform -the restrictive covenant in the, original contract to apply to
not only the brand names sold to plaintiff, but to "any other brand name,"
claiming that to be the true intention of the parties and that its omission was
by mutual mistake. The Supreme Court reformed the contract, but the
Appellate Division reversed, the Court of Appeals affirming.
In order to have reformation of a contract there must exist at the time
36.
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Ross v. Food Specialties Inc., 6 N.Y.2d 336, 189 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1959).
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